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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
B O I ' N I l M l l 1 l I \ : 
Pla in t i f f -Appel lee , : BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
vs. '.:". 
WALTERNOEL STEWART, 
CaselMo !m)bl>' i I 
U c l f r . J . j i , ' ' .a, , , " , t n l . : 
Sta t emen t o f Ju i i sdu (ion 
This i-, an appeal from the final judgment and imposi t ion of sentence 
ic Sn'onil Dii I M I I N 10, • I ' tah. 
Jurisdict ion is based upon Utah Code Annotated (Utah Coae Ann. ; §7 8-2 a-
Statementof the Issues 
1. •" ' . e i s sues tha thehas r a i s ed on 
appeal? The ? eca .rements for an appel lant ' 6 brief are set furt .., i\ - «. _4 
• . . .Utah R . A r r -1 ' - -P •>•• 
appellant s br ief is inadequate an appellate court shou iu
 ; ; , , ia ;l.^ n .a, 
• y« ^ t >. . ^ u t u c . v _ I " ' ' ( ! ! , «+ / r . j u i 
2. Defendant marshal evidence -:?port of Judge Kay ' s 
•- ' ' -• -vUtahR.Civ.P.) 
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provides that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportuni ty of the trial 
court to judge the c redib i l i ty of the wi tnesses . Rule 24(a) (9) , Utah 
R.App.P. , provides that a party chal lenging a fact f inding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the chal lenged finding. The 
consequence o f fail in g to marshal evidence requires that the appellate court 
accept the tr ial cour t ' s f indings as accurate and reviews the trial cour t ' s 
conclusions based upon those facts. State v. Larsen* 2000 UT App. 106; 
9 9 9 P . 2 d l 2 5 2 . 
3. Was there substant ia l evidence presented at t r ia l , and i n the 
appellate record, to support Judge Kay ' s convict ion Defendant? When 
re vie wing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, an appel la te court must 
sustain the trial court 's judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the app el late court otherwise re aches a definite and firm 
convict ion that a mistake has been made." Statev. Reed. 83 9 P. 2d 87 8, 879 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). M,For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must 
decide that the factual f indings made by the trial court are not adequately 
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the tr ial court 's de terminat ion . ' " Jouflas v. Fox 
TelevisionStations.921?,2d\lQAlA(\]Xdih\996^((\noi\n^Statev.Pena. 
869P.2d932,93 5-3 6 (Utah l994 ) ) .Howeve r ,be fo reanappe l l a t ecou r t can 
uphold a convict ion it must be supported by a quantum of evidence 
concerning each el ementof the crime as charged from which the fact finder 
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In addi t ion, a 
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give 
2 
rise to only remote or speculat ive possibi l i t ies of guilt . State v. Layman. 
953 ?.2dl $2.1&6 (Utah Ct.Apv.\99&): Spanish Fork v.Brvan. 1999UT 
App 6 1 ; 975 P.2d 5 0 1 ; and, State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106; 999 P.2d 
1252. 
Determinative Provisions and Statutes 
The foil owing pro vis ions are determinative or of central importance 
to th i sappea l :Rule24 ,UtahRulesofAppe l la teProcedure (UtahR.App.P . ) 
which is included in Appendix F of this brief. 
Statementof theCase 
(a) T h e N a t u r e o f t h e C a s e . 
This is an appeal from the final judgment and imposi t ion of sentence 
in a bench tr ial conducted in the Second Distr ict Court of Davis County, 
Utah. 
(b) The Course of Proceedings . 
On 8 July 2005 Defendant was charged with two (2) counts of 
violat ing the Bountiful Traffic Code. The charges were Speeding, 3 9 miles 
p erhour in a 3 0 mi 1 es p er h our zone, acl as sC mis demeanor , in violat ion of 
Bountiful Traffic Code §4 l -6a -601 ; and Failure to Stop for an Emergency 
Vehicle , a class C misdemeanor, in violat ion of Bountiful Traffic Code 
§ 4 1 - 6 a - 9 0 4 ( l ) ( a ) . ( R - l ) . 
On 7 October 2005 the prosecut ing at torney filed an Amended 
Information charging Defendant with Speeding, 45 miles per hour in a 30 
miles per hour zone, an Infraction, in violat ion of Bountiful Traffic Code 
§41-6a-601, and Fai lure to Yield to an Emergency Vehic le , an Infraction, 
in violat ion of Bountiful Traffic Code §4 l - 6 a - 9 0 4 ( l ) ( a ) . (R-12-13,22 at 
3 
page 1, lines 11-15; page 2, lines 1-14). 
(c) Disposition in the CourtBelow. 
On 10 November 2005 a bench trial was conducted. The trial court 
heard from three (3) witnesses: Bountiful Police Officer Kerry Bell 
("Officer Bell"); Defendant's son, Collin Stewart; and, Defendant. Atthe 
conclusion of the trial, Judge Kay found that the City had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty as charged; and, imposed 
sentence, i. e., a fine of one hundred f ifty-two dollars ($15 2.00). (R-14-17). 
On 7 Dec ember 2 00 5 Defendant appealed Judge Kay's ruling. (R-18). 
(d) Statement of the Facts. 
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is inadequate, substantially 
irrelevant and suffused with argument thereby requiringthatthe following 
Statement of Facts be submitted by Plaintiff. Additionally, it is Plaintiff's 
position that the actual facts of this case should never be re ached because 
the Appellant has failed to adequately brief the case or marshal evidence. 
Nevertheless, in the event that the Court does reach the facts, this 
Statement is provided. 
1. On 8 July 2005 Officer Kerry Bell ("Officer Bell"), a ten (10) 
year veteran (R- 22 atp age 4, lines 15 -20; page 9, lines 2 3 -2 5; page 22, lines 
16-17;page23,lines24-25;page24,line4-5;page25,linel),wasworking 
as a Bountiful City Police Officer. (R-22atpage4, l inesl9-2 1). At about 
7:04 p.m., she was on routine patrol, westbound, in the area of 500 South 
and 1000 East in Bountiful, Utah (R-22 at page 4, lines 24-25; page 25, 
lines 1-3; page 9, lines 5-6) where the speed limit is (30) miles per hour. 
(R-22 at page 1, lines 13-15, 19-20; page 2, lines 1-3). 
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2. At about 7:04 p.m., Officer Bell observed a truck being driven 
eastbound on 500 South, at approximately 800 East toward her posi t ion. 
There were no vehic les in front of the t ruckthat she was observing. (R-1,22 
at page 5, l ines 6-8; page 12, lines 7and 24). 
3. Officer Bell observed that the t r uck ' s emergency lights were 
flashing and visual ly est imated the speed at which the truck was being 
driven at about forty-five (4 5) miles per hour. (R-22 at page 5, lines 6-8). 
She did not know why the t ruck ' s emergency lights had been activated or 
why the driver of the truck was speeding. (R-22 at page 9, l ines 18-2 2; page 
16, lines 15-23; page 2 1 , lines 22-2 5 ; p a g e 2 2 , l i n e s l - 1 3 ; p a g e 2 5 , lines 11-
23; p a g e 2 7 , lines 23-25) . 
4. Officer Bell confirmed her visual es t imate by using a Doppler 
radar speed detect ion device that gave areadingof forty- five (4 5)milesper 
hour. The Doppler radar unit had been previously tes ted and was operating 
correctly. (R-22 at page 5, lines 9-25). 
5. Based upon her observations that the driver of the t ruckwas 
travel ing in excess of the posted speed limit, Officer Bell turned her patrol 
car around - so that she was traveling eastbound on 500 South- activated 
her overhead l ights , and folio wed the driver of the t ruck for approximately 
three (3) b locks . (R-22 at page 6, lines 2 - 8 ) . 
6. There were no vehicles between Officer Bell and the driver of 
the truck as she foil owed eastbound on 5 00 South. (R-22 atpage 9, lines 10-
12). 
7. The driver of the truck testified that he observed Officer Bell, 
"pull into traffic . . . and then . . . she act ivated her l igh t s . " (R-22 a tpage 
5 
42, lines 10-17). 
8. With Officer Bell following him, with her overhead lights 
act ivated, the driver of the truck refused to pull the t ruck to the r ight hand 
side of the roadway and stop but continued to proceed eastbound on 500 
South. (R-22 at page 6, l ines 9-12; page 2 5, lines 16-17; page 42, line 20). 
9. At this point in t ime, Officer Bell act ivated her s i ren. (R-22 at 
page6 , lines 12-13). 
10. At about the intersect ion of 5 00 South and 1100 East , the driver 
o f the t ruck , that Officer Bell was following, stopped in the middle of the 
inter section and at tempted to make a U-turn. (R-22 at page 6, l ines 13-15; 
p a g e l 2 , l i n e 2 5 ; p a g e 13,l ine 1;page 14,lines l - 2 ,5 -6 ,9 -10 ;page43 , l i ne s 
3-5). At this t ime, the driver of the truck testified that he observed Officer 
Be l l ' s patrol car behind him for a second time with her overhead lights 
flashing and her siren sounding. (R-22 at page 43, l ines 10-12; page 53, 
lines 12-25; page 54, lines 16-25). 
11. At this point in t ime, Officer Bell turned off her siren and 
maneuvered her patrol car so that it was along side and par al lei to the truck, 
which was now westbound on 500 South. (R-22 at page 6, l ines 15-21). 
12. Officer Bell identif ied the driver of the t ruck, as a whi te , adult 
male, and told him that he needed to pull the truck to the side of the 
roadway and stop. (R- 22 at page 6, lines 15 -16 ,18 -19 ,25 ; page 7, l ines 1-
14;page 11, lines 18-19 ,25 ;page 12, lines 1-2;page 13, l i nes21-23 ;page 
43 , l ines 16, 19-20). 
13. In response to Officer Be l l ' s verbal d i rec t ive , the driver of the 
truck told her that he needed to "get to the hospital , " f in i shed making a U-
6 
turn, and drove the truck westbound, down 500 South, away from Officer 
B e H ' s p o s i t i o n . ( R - 2 2 a t p a g e 6 , l i n e s l 6 - 2 1 ;page l I , l i n e s 2 2 - 2 3 ; p a g e l 2 , 
lines 1-2;page 13, l i nes21-23 ;page20 , lines 16 -17 ;page43 , lines 17-18, 
2 1 - 2 2 ; p a g e 4 4 , l i n e s 6 - 7 ) . 
14. At this point in time, Officer Bell deact iva ted heroverhead 
l ights, turned her patrol vehicle around, and followed the driver of the 
truck down 500 South to Lake view Hospital (R-22 at page 6, lines 22-24; 
page 7, lines 1-4; page 9, line 9; page 11, lines 8 -14) . 
15. At Lake view Hospital , Officer Bell observed the driver of the 
truck pull into the emergency room area and the space reserved for 
ambulances , park, get out of the truck and walk to the door of the Lake view 
Emergency Room. (R-22 at page 7, lines 19-20; page 16, l ines 24-2 5; page 
17, lines 3-5; page 43 , lines 24-25). 
16. At this t ime, Officer Bell observed, for the first time, that the 
driver of the truck was holding something to his leg and that he was 
bleeding. (R-22 a tpage 8, lines 1-2; page 17, lines 19-23 ;page 44, lines 13-
14). 
17. Based up on her observat ions, Officer Bell issued the driver of 
the truck, later identif ied as Wal terNoel Stewart ("Stewar t" ) , a citation 
charging him with one (1) count of Speeding and one (1) count of Failure 
to Yield to Emergency Vehicle . 
S u m m a r y o f A r g u m e n t s on Appeal 
1. Because Defendan t failed to a d e q u a t e l y b r i e f the issues that 
he has r a i s e d , i f a n y , the C o u r t should dec l ine to rev iew them. 
Defendant has failed to comply with the pro vis ions of Rule 24, Utah 
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R.App.P. It is a well es tabl ished that a reviewing court wil l not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed. 
2. De fendantcha l l enges the tr ia l cour t ' s f indings of fact, but, 
on appeal, does not marshal evidence in support of the trial court's 
f indings. Therefore , the trial court's findings are accepted as valid. 
Folio wing the trial of this case, the trial court issued oral Findings of 
Fact. (R-22 at page 6 1 , lines 22-25; page 62, lines 1-7). In his appeal , 
Defendant chal lenges Judge Kay ' s f indings. Pursuant to Rule 52(a) , Utah 
R.Civ.P. , and Rule 24, Utah R.App.P. , Defendant has a duty to marshal 
evidence. However , Defendant has failed to carry his burden. The 
consequence of Defendant 's failure to marshal evidence is that the trial 
cour t ' s Findings of Fact should be accepted as valid. 
3. There is substant ia l evidence in the record to support the 
trial court 's verdict . 
There was admissible and unrebut ted evidence presented at trial 
es tabl ishing each element of each crime with which Defendant was 
charged. This const i tutes substant ia l evidence in the appel la te record 
sufficient to suppor t the trial cour t ' s verdict . 
Arguments on Appeal 
1. Because Defendant failed to adequate lybr ie f the issues that he has 
raised, i fany , the Court should decline to review them. 
Rule 24, U tahR. App.P. , sets forth both the required form and 
contents of appel late br iefs . Pursuant to sub-part (2 ) (a ) (5) (A) , an 
appe l l an t ' s br ief must con tain a s tatement of the issues presented for 
review, including fore ach issue: the standard of appel la te re view with 
support ing authori ty; and, ci tat ion to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the tr ial court . In addit ion to this provis ion , sub-part 
8 
(2)(a)(9) requi res that the argument shall contain the content ions and 
reasons of the appel lant with respect to the issues presented , including 
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the tr ial court, with 
ci tat ions to the au thor i t ies , s tatutes, andpar ts of the record relied on. In 
Statev. Lucero. 2002UT App 13 5, 47 P.3d 107, <h 13, this Court 
conc luded tha t , 
" [ t ]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply 
with the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable us to 
unders tand . . . what part icular errors were a l legedly made, 
where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under 
appl icable au thor i t ies , those errors are mater ial ones 
necess i ta t ing reversal or other relief." 
In the present case, after a bench tr ial , Judge Kay found that there 
was no quest ion that Defendant was speeding and that Defendant failed 
to yield to an emergency vehicle . (R-15-16; 22 at page 62, lines 2-7). 
Defendant appealed Judge Kay's findings s ta t ing , "[ t ]he basis of 
the appeal is in terpre ta t ion of facts and relevant conclus ions of law by 
the trial off icer ." (R- l 8). In his brief, Defendant frames the issue as, 
"[d]id the Dis t r ic t Court err in its November 10,2005 rul ing, both as to 
the evidence and the l aw?" See Appellant fs Brief at page 1, Statement of 
Issues. However , Defendant has failed to cite where in the record the 
issues concerning insufficiency of evidence were preserved for appeal 
as required by Rule 24(a) (5)(A) , Utah R. App.P. Defendant has also 
failed to set forth the proper standard of review for these and other 
issues that he might have raised with ci tat ions for each standard of 
review. Final ly , the "Argument" section of Defendan t ' s Appellate Brief 
fails to include any relevant ci tat ion, authori ty, or meaningful legal 
9 
analysis that would support his a l legat ions that the evidence presented 
in support of his speeding and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle 
convict ions was insufficient; or, that Judge ' s Kay 's in terpre ta t ion and 
applicat ion of the law was deficient . 
In effect, Defendant ' s Brief shifts the burden of de te rmining what 
his appealable issues actual ly are to Plaintiff and also requi res that this 
Court assume the role of pres iding over Defendant ' s appeal as though it 
we rea t r i a l denovo . 
In the event that the Court reaches Defendant ' s issues 
notwi ths tanding his non-compl iance with Rule 24, Utah R.App.P . , 
Plaintiff offers the fol lowing as rebut ta l . 
Defendant does make reference to Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-212in 
his "Table of Author i t i e s , " and draws the Cour t ' s a t tent ion to Bountiful 
City Police Depar tment Pursuit Driving Pol icy, General Order 9 2 - 1 ; and, 
two (2) Utah appel late court decis ions , i .e. . D a w . State et. al.% 1999 UT 
46, 980 P.2d 1171; and, Utah Department of Public Safety v. Utah 
Career Service Review Board. 2004 UT App 171; 92 P.3d 776. However, 
Defendant fails to establ ish how any of this information is re levant , 
author i ta t ive , or meaningful to his appeal. In fact, to do so would 
undermine Defendan t ' s current pos i t ion. 
Utah Code Ann. §41 -6a-212, "Emergency Vehic les" 
Defendant argues that , becauseo fh i s "emergency ," he should be 
allowed to disregard and violate traffic laws so as to arr ive at a hospital 
10 
andrece ive e m e r g e n t ) o t r v u e s . 
Judge Kay recognized the confusion that accept ing Defendant's 
p o s i t i o n H u u 1 d LI L<il i 1 ui u IIILI IIIi.IIII LI .» u 1 ill „ ilt i , iii^ ^ ml I K . I L 1^ al 
p a g e SK l i n e s 2 4 - 2 5 ; p a g e 5 9, l ines 1 -4 | u | f icer Be l l , a \ e t e r an off icer 
>> i L I I i t ii f l n ) 11 f 111.1 ic n ^ h i in t ( I I li H i f\ I IN 11 in it (i in ( 
activated his emergency flashers. (R-22 at page (i lines 18-22). 
H o w e v e r , JU L l e n d a n I <n i t i t » 1 l i a l l i t > h u u l d Ilia * L II • L U I K I L1 W I * J as 
though he were an emergency vehicle. (R-22 at page 4 1 lines 20-22; 
p a g e )*J, I I U L O . ' 1 ' i I , ill I M l | V 11 1 1 Hi I I H i l l f I 
A n n . §41 - f i a -212 . 
an o p e r a t o r of an a u t h o r i z e d e m e r g e n c y v e h i c l e may e x c e e d m a x i m u m 
ujj a II mi mi in I t I I mi I i j I mi ii u i a I it I in I II I in mi mi iii in t ir fii inn in 1 in 
spec i f i ed d i r e c t i o n s w h e n in pu r su i t of an ac tua l or s u s p e c t e d n 1 iloi of 
l l l l l i . IIL.il '. 
In the present case, Defendant did not provide any evidence that 
li ir ^ I I l i t ! * in ~ ir ^ I I I I II t l i if i : - . — . - . . . ^ 
v e h i c l e or h i s t i u c k a s an e m e r g e n c y v e h i c l e . H o w e v e r , u n i c e r hew was 
111 [ i i ill il  II I ill li 11 ill II III i il il II 1111 M i ill 1 III ii III II I ' v ~ • ~,. * i ; *
 e s 
15-20; p a g e 9, l ines . ^ -2 5; p a g e 12, l ines 22 , n u c b i o - i ; , p a g e 2 ^ , l ines 
' Defendant's contention that he was facing an "%emergeik M niusl be read against 
the evidence that he refiised emergency ambulance services fron i I )avis County 
Sheriffs Dispatch (R-22 at page 40, linesl3-17); and, after ani\ mg dl the hospital lit 
refused to allow emergency room personnel to treat him for approximately (40) minutes 
while he waited for a second opinion as to how the cut on his leg would finally be treated 
(R-22 at page 44, lines 15-25; page 45, lines 1-6). 
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24-25; page 24, l i n e l ; page 25 , line 1). She observed and detected 
Defendan t speed ing in viola t ion of the Ci ty ' s traffic code. (R-22 at page 
5, lines 9-25). I nan effort to apprehend him, Officer Bell negot ia ted an 
immediate U-turn (R-22 at page 6, lines 2-8) and followed Defendant 
with overhead lights f lashing and sir en sounding (R-22 at page 6, lines 
2-13). Later, Officer Bell negot ia ted a second U-turn to follow 
Defendant to the hospi ta l . (R-22 at page 6, lines 22-24; page 7, l ines 1-4; 
page 9, line 9; page 11, liens 8-14). Officer Bell complied with Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6a-212 et. seq. 
Bountiful City Pursuit Driving Policy 
Judge Kay recognized that , pursuant to the facts he was presented 
at t r ial , Bountiful City Pol ice Department General Order 9 2 - 1 , known as 
the ' 'Pursu i t Driving Pol icy ," was inapplicable because this was not the 
kind of high speed pursui t that the policy was created to deal wi th . 
Rather, Judge Kay recognized that in this case Officer Bell was making a 
routine traffic s top. (R-22 at page 20, lines 1-25; page 2 1 , l ines 1-18; 
and, page 56, lines 18-24). However , in the event that this Court 
determines to evaluate the appl icabi l i ty of the Pursui t Dr iv ing Pol icy, 
Plaintiff submits the fol lowing argument. 
The Pursuit Driving Policy establ ishes that all vehic les operated 
by Bountiful pol ice are author ized emergency vehic les . (Addendum, 
Appendix Hat page 43 , Section III , Sub-part A). It es tabl i shes 
guidelines and sets policy for the operat ion and use of an author ized 
emergency vehicle including the pur suit for apprehension of suspected 
law viola tors . (Addendum, Appendix H at page 43 , Section I ) . A 
12 
pursui t" is defined as, 
"An event involving one or more law enforcement officers 
a t tempt ing to apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle 
while the suspect is trying to avoid arrest by using high speed 
dr iving or other evasive tact ics , such as driving off a 
highway, turning suddenly or driving in a legal manner hut 
willfully failing to yield to the officer 's signal to stop." 
Emphasis not in or iginal . (Ad-1 '""him. A p p e n , ^ v Tl 1+ n -
44 Sec t ionTILSub-par tCV 





 - ^ - : " « ind as s^,Ari MS= pract ical notify the 
L.ornmunicaLioiib O i i • <. 1 uuuv.a i iu i j ,u iuuiv / in ; . i * a\ c
 A, w^mria— 
T : / ] dc - r- ptioii of i 4 T P I c'e and license number, description of 
suspect veh ic le ' s occupants , and the reason iwi ,he pursuit A ; 
^ .. i:.. n ,. « , ^ e 4 P ^ e c t * ^T " i: '^  • * i»-1 A ^  u * n ^ n a " P M r s u i f 
Boun t i fu l J - being conducted, the Communivain ., - , 
icar ihe frequency for emergency traffic and instruct the 
ini t ia t ing pursui t unit, and assigned backup unit to change to 
the Statewide One Radio Channel. The Communicat ions 
Officer will announce the pursuit and notify the supervisor or 
officer in charge. The Communications Officer will also run 
regis t ra t ion and want information on the suspect vehicle if 
l icense # is avai lable and have that information immediately 
avail able upon re quest, but will not be broadcas t . " 
Addendum, Appendix H at page 49, Section V, Sub-part E). 
i . - v* 11 o v a n f e r m i n a t e w h e n t h e s u s p e c t s t o p s c • i: 1 1 I e i i ;:  i 11 i ill:;; ::: f i , , • t 
s i ispect is knownanH f h e offense is not a forcib 1 e fe 1 ony. (Adden :1 I Im, 
Appendix H a t p a g e _ . , u i , . ) 11 \" 1, 11 u b p a i 1: * 1 i i: I • I 3) • '••'".; ":. " • 
In the present case, Defendant i^  confused and angered by the fact 
that his cell ulai • i . ^ e r s e n c v t e L u u u u w u „ 
Davis County Sher i f f ' s D ;^p;urh fVnter * - n ^ ) < \ "ountv Dispatch ' \ \\ as 
not broadcast to and receiv cu „ : ,\\^ ^ ^ i , ; . 
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Center ("Bountiful Dispatch") and relayed to Officer Bel l . (R-22 at 
page 23 , l ines 18-22; page 26, l ines 6-7). 
But, Defendant ' s confusion and anger do not change the fact that 
Officer Bell fully complied with the Pursuit Driving Policy. Officer 
Bell was operat ing an authorized emergency vehicle . (R-22 at page 4, 
lines 15-20; page 9, lines 23-25 ; page 22, lines 16-17; page 23 , l ines 24-
25; page 24, line 1 ;page 25, line 1). She observed and detected 
Defendant speeding. (R-22 at page 5, lines 9-25). She followed 
Defendant with her overhead l ights f lashing and siren sounding. (R-22 at 
page 6, l ines 2-13] . Defendant willfully failed to yield to Officer Be l l ' s 
signals to s top. (R-22 a tpage 6, l ines 2-13) . Officer Bell contacted 
Bountiful Dispatch and advised them that Defendant was fail ing to yield 
to her signal to pull over and s top. (R-22 a tpage 10, lines 10-13). 
Officer Bell identified Defendant and the dest ination to which he was 
going and terminated the "pursu i t , " turning off her overhead l ights and 
siren (R-22 at page 6, l ines 15-21]; but, continued to follow Defendant 
a n d i s s u e d h i m a c i t a t i o n . (R-22 a tpage 6, lines 22-24; page 7, l ines 1-4; 
page 9, line 9; page 11, l ines 8-14). Officer Bell completely and 
reasonably complied with the Driving Pursuit Policy. 
Defendant would also have this Court rule, in cont ravent ion to 
Judge Kay, that once Officer Bell d iscont inued her "pursu i t " she was 
precluded from making further contact with him and ci t ing him for 
v iola t ing the traffic code. Such a posi t ion fails to account for the 
balancing of interests that Officer Bell made between cont inuing to 
follow a traffic law violator against sending an emergency signal to the 
14 
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•. -; (a) Day v. State et il 
concludes that it stand tor the proposit ion t h a t / ' n e a u : police 
the speed limit * See Appellant .>> iefatpage t * raragrapt 
l n c juuy \ 
applv the Day decision upra. in this case was appropria te t^R-22 at 
v. State decis ion, sup> pro\ ides, among other tr. ngs, an explanai ium-f 
1
 ee 
Kay ruled that the Pursuit Dvw . ..g Policy was not appl icable to trus 
establ ishing law enforcement ' s duty c.,- ig a high speed purs ui, -v ^ -Id 
InDan, jwprf l , the Utah Supreme C -* -1 J X , ' ^ i L e M o t o r 
r ' ' ~ ' d 
suspec tadu t>( i c a r e i ' ' .mrapa r t i e son tnen ighway Huwcver, the Day 
* :se because n^ fMrd 
party was involved » ; a rnis incident. T h e D a v C o i ; i dno t ru . e 
r
^ ' uied that an 
»w i cer conduct ing a \ irsu M IT ast act reasonably and with appropriate 
T L i e 
15 
Court listed a set of factors that can be considered in de termining 
whether an officer acted with reasonable care. 
Assuming arguendo that Judge Kay 's decision was not appropr ia te 
and that the Day decision* supra* doe shave some bearing on this case, 
Defendant has failed to es tabl ish that Officer Bel l ' s conduct in t rying to 
stop him, while he had a c u t i n h i s l e g , w a s unreasonable; and, he cannot 
establish that it was unreasonable because Officer Bell did not know that 
he was actually injured unti l she arrived at the hospi tal . (R-22 at page 8, 
l ines 1-2; page 17, lines 19-23; page 44, lines 13-14;page 57, l ines 9-
14). 
(b) Utah Dep. of Public Safety v. Utah Career Service Review Board 
Defendant also cites Utah Department of Public Safety v. Utah 
Career Service Review Board* supra. Like the Day decis ion, supra, 
Judge Kay re cognized that this dec i s ionhadno appl icat ion at the trial of 
t h i s ca se . However, the Utah Department of Public Safety v. Utah 
Career Service Review Board decis ion, supra, is interesting for one 
reason. In footnote 3, the author of the opinion provides the re levant 
parts of the statutory defini t ion of "evading ." That s ta tutory defini t ion 
could easily be applied in this case as Defendant operated his t ruck in 
willful or wanton disregard of Officer Bel l ' s signal and interfered with 
or endangered the operat ion of other vehicles or persons ; and, a t tempted 
to flee or elude Officer Bel l . (R-22 at page 23, lines 2 -25] . 
Pursuant to Rule 24. Utah R. App. P., and State v. Lucero.suvra* 
because Defendant failed to adequately brief the issues that he has 
raised in his appeal the Court should decline to review any and all of 
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Defendant , "may have at t imes nojbzen watching [his] speedometer" 
(Emphasis not in or ig ina l ) . (R-22 at page 49, lines 18-19); 3) Officer 
Bell establ ished the speed at which Defendant was t ravel ing by using a 
speed detect ion device that had be en tested and was operat ing correct ly; 
and, 4) that Officer Bell had no bias , prejudice or prior deal ings with 
Defendant prior to this traffic incident (R-22 at page 8, l ines 9-16) . 
Some examples of evidence that Defendant might have marshaled 
with regard to the Fai l ing to Yield to an Emergency Vehicle charge 
include, but are not l imited to: 1) Officer Bell did not know why 
Defendant was speeding. (R-22 at page 9, lines 18-22; page 15, l ines 15-
23 ; page 2 1 , lines 22-25; page 22, l ines 1 - I3 ;page25 , lines 11-23 ;page 
27, lines 23-25) ; 2) ini t ia l ly , after observing Defendant speeding , 
Officer Bell turned her patrol car around, activated her overhead l ights , 
and followed Defendant for approximately three (3) b locks . (R-22 at 
page 6, lines 2-8); 3) there was no traffic between Officer Bell and 
Defendant as she followed him eastbound on 500 South. (R-22 at page 9, 
l ines 10-12); 4) Defendant observed Officer Bel l ' s patrol car and 
overhead lights f lashing. (R-22 at page 42, lines 10-17]; 5) Defendant 
refused to pull his truck to the right hand side of the roadway and stop 
(R-22 at page 6, lines 9-12; page 25 , lines 16-17; page 42, l ine 20) ; 
6)Officer Bell act ivated the siren (R-22 at page 6, lines 12-13); 7) 
Defendant stopped in the middle of an intersect ion to get d i rec t ions to 
the hospital and at tempted to make a U-turn; but, did not stop for Officer 
Be l l ' s signals to stop (R-22 at page 6, lines 13-15; page 12, line 25 ; page 
13, line 1; page 14, lines 1-2, 5-6, 9-10; page 43, lines 3-5); 8) Defendant 
18 
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. •. .es 2 1 ^ :3 ;page 20, lines I 6-1 7; page 42. lines 17-18, 21-2-:. page 
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accept Judge Kay 's findings as val id . 
3. The re is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial 
court ' s verdict . 
The ordinances relevant to Defendant ' s appeal are Bountiful 
Traffic Code §41-6a-601 , Speeding ("the Speeding ord inance") 2 ; and, 
Bountiful Traffic Code §41-6a -904( l ) ( a ) , Failing to Yield Right of Way 
to an Emergency Vehicle ("the Fai l ing to Yield Right of Way 
ordinance") 3 . 
Substant ial and unrebut ted evidence was presented at the bench 
trial es tabl ishing each element of each offense with which Defendant 
was charged. Specifically, the elements of Speeding are: 1) a speed 
limit es tabl ished by a supervis ing enti ty, in this case a munic ipa l i ty ; 2) a 
person; 3) operat ing a motor veh ic le ; 4) at a speed greater than that 
es tabl ished by the municipal i ty . At the bench trial of this case, Judge 
Kay heard the following tes t imony from Officer Bell concern ing 
Defendant ' s violat ion of the Speeding ordinance: 1) the speed limit on 
500 South in Bountiful is thir ty (30) miles per hour (R-22 at page 1, lines 
2The relevant portions of the Speeding ordinance provide in part that, "[a] person 
may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing,. . . 
any speed in excess of the limits . . . established [by a municipality] is prima facie 
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful." 
3The relevant portions of the Failing to Yield Right of Way ordinance provide in 
part that, "[ejxcept when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a vehicle, 
upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using audible or visual 
signals . . . shall: (a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel 
to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any 
intersection; and, (b)then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle 
has passed 
20 
D e f e n d a n t o p e r a t e h i s t r i i c k o n 5 0 0 S o u t h i n B o i i n t i f i I l ; 3 ) a t t h e s p e e d o f 
f o r t y - f i \ e (4 5) n i i 1 e s p e r h o u r. (R 2 2 a t p a. g e 5,1 i n : s 16 2 2) • " 
The elements of a Failure to Yield Right of Way charge are 
p e r s o n ; 2 ) o p e r a t i n g a m o t o r v e h i c 1 e; 3) b e i n g i m m e d i a t e 1;; a p
 r 
by an authorized emergency vehicle n<;in o nuJihlt or visual s ignals . 4) 
the person ft. ,. :_ . .. s » . a 
no^itinn po^'illpl to ru * »<; r 1 ose as possih 1 e to th* r i sh t -hand edge or 
. ... w mgnw a> , L,.~W4. 
remaining stopped UTi4 «rhe:Mithnri7edemergenc'v \ e h i c l e h a s p a s " 
OfficerBeT ^ -em M O Defendant * s \ ioh:ti».n of the Fai lure o ^ ' c i d 
KigL . . t 
was speeding she H(M i5 . * ed h erhead lights, a^d follow ed Defendant 
forapproxi m a t e 1 j it 1 11: : • i ( 3 ) 1: 1 : c 1 : s. (I «! 2 2 a t p i g : 6 1 i l • • • s 2 8 ):; 2 ) t II: i i • i \ • 
was no traffic her wee:-, of f icer Bell and Defendant as she followed (R-22 
i ii h i s r e a r v i e w m i r r o r ( R - 2 2 a t p a g e 4 2 , l i n e s 1 0 -1 ? ) ; 4) D e f e n d a n t 
II i I ii II ' t 
p a g e 6 , l i n e s 9 - 1 2 ; p a g e 2 5 , l i n e s 1 1 : p a g e 4 2 , l i n e 2 0 ) ; ^ ) e v e n t u a l l y 
< i I I I I 11 LI i I I  I ! mi I ' in in Il I  I I in in in i in I i
 s I , I  t i" I II in in I I ' I • • • I' I II i I  in I t 
the intersection of 500 South and 1 1 00 East Defer dant s topped in the 
1 
t o m a k e a I J -11 I r n; b i 11 d i d n o t s t o p f o r O f f i c e r B e 11::; (R - 2 2 a t p a g i 6 
line s 1 3 1 5; p a g e 1 2, 1 i i :t z 2 5 ; p i g e 1 3 1 i i I 11; j: i g i 1 \ 111 I i s 1 2 5 i 
21 
10; page 43 , lines 3-5); 7) Defendant noticed Officer Be l l ' s patrol car a 
second time while he was trying to get direct ions to the hospi ta l and 
making a U-turn. (R-22 at page 43 , lines 10-12; page 53, lines 12-25; 
page 54, lines 16-25]; 8) Officer Bell told Defendant that he needed to 
pull to the side of the roadway. (R-22 at page 6, lines 1 5-16, 1 8-19, 25 ; 
page 7, l ines 1-14; page 11, l ines 18-19, 25 ;page 12, lines 1-2; page 13, 
lines 21 -23 ; page 43 , lines 16, 19-20); 9) in response to Officer Be l l ' s 
verbal d i rect ive , Defendant drove away from Officer Be l l ' s pos i t ion . (R-
22 at page 6, lines 16-21; page 11, l ines22-23; page 12, lines 1-2; page 
13, lines 2 1-23; page 20, lines 16-17; page 43 , lines 17-18 ,21-22) . 
In contravent ion of this substant ia l and unrebut ted evidence that 
was presented at the bench trial and that is contained in the appel la te 
record, Defendant also alleges that Judge Kay interpreted the facts 
incorrect ly . Pursuant to Rule 52(a) , Utah R.Civ.P. this Court should not 
reassess Judge Kay 's assessment of the wi tnesses ' c redibi l i ty . In 
ProMax Development Corporationv. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 , 257 
(UtahCt . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h a t , " i t i s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
role to assess witness credibi l i ty , given its advantaged posi t ion to 
observe test imony firsthand, and normally, we will not second guess the 
trial cour t ' s findings in this regard . . . We e m p h a s i z e , . . . that this court 
does not sit as a fact f inder." And/mStatev. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994), the Utah Supreme Court he Id that a trial cour t ' s determinat ion 
that the factual evidence before it substant ia l ly complies with a 
par t icular statute is a discret ionary rul ing involving the appl icat ion of 
f ac t s to l aw . Trial courts are granted discret ion i n m a k i n g s u c h a 
22 
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P A V ^006. 
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Bountiful Speeding ordinance 
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SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6a-601. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate 
speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed 
limits — Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other 
traffic, weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603, 
the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in 
Section 41-6a-303; 
(b> 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(o 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604. any speed in excess of the limits 
provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-603 
is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it 
is unlawful. 
(4; The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change 




Bountiful Failing to Yield to Emergency Vehicle ordinance 
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41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle — Necessary-
signals — Stationary emergency vehicle — Du-
ties of respective operators. 
(1) Except when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a 
vehicle, upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle 
using audible or visual signals under Section 41-6a-212 or 41-6a-1625, shall: 
(a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel 
to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, 
clear of any intersection; and 
(b) then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency 
vehicle has passed. 
29 
APPENDIX C 
Transcript of trial court's oral decision 
it's possible he would get his desired escort to the hospital 
but Officer Bell doesn't know if he yells out the window when 
he's already been evading her that he's not going to just 
keep driving off. She doesn't know that he actually has an 
injury and Mr. Stewart makes a fatal assumption and that is 
every time you call 9-1-1 you're speaking with every 
policeman on the planet. You're not. In Davis County, you 
call 9-1-1 on a cell phone, you go to the Davis County 
Dispatch Center in Farmington. 
That's what Mr. Stewart wants to have happen but 
it's not what happened in fact. He's trying to create a 
justification based on necessity, Your Honor, and regardless 
of the cases he cites, necessity is a justification to a 
criminal charge unless it's created by the defendant and in 
this case, Mr. Stewart created his own necessity. He had a 
choice to make. Is this serious enough so I get emergency 
help or can I get there myself obeying all the traffic rules 
required of me? He made that choice and now it's been to his 
detriment. We believe that the burden has been met for both 
charges. We request the Court enter a conviction for both 
charges. 
THE COURT: Okay, the issues in this case are 
really two issues. The first one is whether or not there was 
speeding. There is no question, I don't see any - I didn't 
see the defendant testify that he was not speeding. I think 
61 
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1 his testimony was that with everything going on, he wasn't 
2 looking at his speedometer. I don't think that there's any 
3 i question that he was going what was stated, 45 miles an hour 
4 i in a 30 miles an hour zone and there's no question that he 
5 failed to yield to an emergency vehicle. He stated that he 
6 i saw the flashing lights and didn't know what she was going 
7 | but did not yield. 
8 ! The question is, was there any sort of exception, 
9 J whether necessity or otherwise that would justify this 
t 
10 j behavior? I guess it really gets down to this, we can 
11 i justify and rationalize anything in our own minds. I think 
12 j my brother a long time ago pointed out the word rationalize 
13 ; to me, he says that if you cut it down into two words is 
14 i rationing lies and I think we kind of look at things from our 
15 | own prospective and sometimes when we look from our own 
16 j prospective, we're wondering why the rest of world, why 
17 . doesn't the rest of the world understand what I'm doing and, 
18 j why - it's clear to me, why isn't it clear to everyone else? 
i 
19 j I have to say taking judicial notice of 500 South and knowing 
i 
20 j that it is a very, very, very busy road and at certain times 
21 ' of the day it's busier than other times of the day but the 
i 
22 | fact of the matter is, it's a 30 miles an hour speed limit 
j 
23 j for a reason. There are traffic lights, about five traffic 
i 
24 j lights from 500 West up to Orchard Drive and anybody moving 
! 
25 I up back and forth with all the people and all the 
j 62 
i 32 
intersection and traffic and people walking, that's what it 
is. If people start to drive beyond it - you know it always 
gets me that if we say that, okay, if everybody murdered and 
I murdered it wouldn't be a problem or if everybody raped and 
I committed a rape, that wouldn't be a problem because 
everybody does it an unfortunately, if we did that, we would 
not have a society, we would not have a civilization because 
we could always justify that what everybody does and nobody 
lives the standards that we set as a society. 
So in this case maybe, you know, I'm not faulting 
the officer for pursuing you, Mr. Stewart. I'm not faulting 
the officer for making sure that the speeding limits in 
Bountiful are enforced and I think what occurred is simply 
this, you didn't stop, she got mad, you had an attitude and 
she was going to show you who was boss and I don't think 
that's an abnormal reaction to the situation. We'd like 
everybody to be perfect, you know, it's kind of hard to be 
perfect under pressure. It's kind of hard to be perfect 
under a situation that is a stressful situation for all 
parties. So I am finding you guilty of both of these 
infractions. You have the right to be sentenced in a period 
of not less than two nor more than 45 days but whereas these 
are basically on the 2005 bail schedule as to the amounts, 
it's probably not going to change what the maximum would be. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas. and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies: and 
liii a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts: 
(d) interlocutor/ appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony: 
ie) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony: 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to. divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity: 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court: and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 




Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
5SA: in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are noc necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings offixcz and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41'b\ The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b). 50<a» and «bi, 56. and 59 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
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APPENDIX F 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a> Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
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APPENDIX G 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
Ui> Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on 
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BOUNTIFUL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Date Effective 
1 Revision Dates 
September 1,1996 | General Order 
1 Subject: 
| 92-1 
Pursuit Driving Policy 
Purpose 
To provide a pursuit policy for the Bountiful Police Department which establishes guidelines 
and regulations pertaining to the operation of police vehicles during a pursuit* 
L Objective 
To establish guidelines and set policy for the operation and use of motor vehicles by Bountiful Police 
Officers during emergency vehicle operation, to include the pursuit for apprehension of suspected law 
violators. 
EL Legal Disclaimer 
This policy is for departmental use only and does not apply to any criminal or civil proceeding. This 
policy shall not be construed as creating a higher legal standard of care or safety in an evidentiary 
sense with respect to third party claim. Violations of this policy will form the basis of departmental 
administrative sanctions only. 
DDL Definitions 
A. Authorized Emergency Vehicle 
All vehicles operated by the police department to carry out the mission, goals and objectives 
of this agency. 41-6-1 (3) U.C.A. 
B Emergency warning equipment required on emergency vehicles. 
1. Siren 
2. Emergency Lights 
a. Emergency vehicles shall be equipped with some type of emergency lights, 
either overheads for marked units, grille lights, dash lights or combination 
thereof. Most commonly, the vehicle shall have a combination of red and blue 
emergency lights installed as equipment on the designated emergency vehicle. 
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C. Pursuit 
An event involving one or more law enforcement officers attempting to apprehend a suspect 
operating a motor vehicle while the suspect is trying to avoid arrest by using high speed 
driving or other evasive tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly or driving in 
a legal manner but willfully failing to yield to the officer's signal to stop. 
D. Roadblock 
1. Total Roadblock 
Is a physical blockage of the entire highway using vehicles, materials or other devices, 
leaving no room for an approaching vehicle to avoid the barrier. 
2. Partial Roadblock 
Is an incomplete blockage of the roadway, leaving room for an approaching vehicle 
to avoid the barrier. 
E. Ramming 
The deliberate act of impacting a violator's vehicle with another vehicle to functionally 
damage or otherwise force the violators vehicle to stop. 
F. Supervisor 
For the purpose of this policy, a supervisor is the Chief of Police, Lieutenant, Sergeant, 
Corporal or Senior Officer in charge of the shift. 
G. Forcible Felony 
76-2-402 (3) Utah Code Annotated - For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes, 
but is not limited to aggravated assault, mayhem, murder in the first and second degree, 
manslaughter, kidnaping, and aggravated kidnaping, rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated 
sexual assault, as they are defined in Chapter 5 of this code. Also includes arson, robbery, 
and burglary as defined in Chapter 6 of this code. Any other felony offense which involves 
the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or 
serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible felony. Burglary of a vehicle, as defined in 
Section 76-6-204 shall not constitute a forcible felony except where the vehicle is occupied 
at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
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IV, Policy 
The major objective of the Bountiful Police Department is the protection of life and property. Vehicle 
pursuits are recognized as a valid enforcement activity performed by officers attempting to apprehend 
fleeing suspects under certain circumstances. Pursuits are only justified when there is a necessity of 
immediate apprehension. 
Officers are obligated to continuously weigh the gravity of the offense, or the emerging 
circumstances, against the potential dangers the pursuit poses to their self or to others. It is also 
recognized that what started as a minor traffic offense may become a serious crime and threat to the 
community as the pursuit continues. 
The supervisor or officer in charge is responsible for assuming management control by monitoring 
the pursuit, weighing significant facts available at the time, and terminating the pursuit if apprehension 
cannot be effected with reasonable safety. 
This policy does not preclude the pursuing officers from terminating a pursuit at their discretion. 
The policy and procedure set forth in this document is intended to serve as guidelines on which to 
base sound decisions. State law does not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor does the law protect the driver 
from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of these privileges. (Ref. 41-6-76 U.C.A.). 
A. Consideration of Police Pursuits 
The decision to initiate a pursuit must be based on good judgment, tempered with common 
sense and foresight of potential hazards. 
Officers directly involved in a pursuit will be accountable for the decision to continue the 
pursuit in light of the considerations listed below. 
1. Criminal misdemeanors and traffic violations do not warrant prolonged pursuit or the 
operation of the police vehicle at excessive speeds. 
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2. Felony criminal violations may require pursuit if the officer is to apprehend the 
suspect. However, in initiating and continuing the pursuit, an officer will be required 
to justify the pursuit based on the following considerations: 
a. The nature of violation and hazard that it creates. 
b. The likelihood of successful apprehension. 
c. The nature of the location (residential, business, school zone, etc.). 
d. The weather, and road conditions and associated factors. 
e. The officer's driving skills and the condition of the police vehicle. 
f. When the driver of the pursued vehicle displays a willful and wanton disregard 
for passengers, and/or other drivers by unnecessarily endangering their safe 
passage, it may be proper to continue the pursuit, utilizing emergency lights 
and siren for the purpose of serving as a warning to these drivers and the 
public at large. 
3. Considerations for continuing the pursuit are not restricted to only those regarding 
the initial offense. Every factor must be evaluated as it occurs. 
B. Restrictions of Police Pursuit Involvement 
1. Assisting Police Units 
Only the police unit initiating the pursuit and any assigned secondary unit shall pursue 
the suspect vehicle. No More than Two units shall be involved in the actual pursuit 
unless assigned by the supervisor on duty. 
Other police units close to the pursuit should attempt to position themselves at 
strategic points to assist the pursuing police units in the event the suspect is stopped 
or the original pursuing police unit loses the suspect vehicle. Police units assisting 
may parallel or trail behind a pursuit only at the direction of the supervisor. 
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C. Unmarked Police Vehicles 
If a pursuit is initiated by an unmarked police vehicle, the pursuing officer shall abandon the 
pursuit when a marked police vehicle is in a position to assume the pursuit. The unmarked 
police unit shall remain available to respond to the scene of apprehension. 
D. Striking or Forcing Vehicles Off The Road 
Ramming, striking, or forcing a fleeing vehicle off the road must be considered potential 
deadly force and the guidelines for use of force and deadly force apply. The pursuing officer 
may strike or force the suspect vehicle off the road only if: 
1. The suspect is wanted for a forcible felony and all other attempts to stop the pursuit 
have failed and continued pursuit poses an immediate danger. 
2. Continued pursuit poses an immediate and substantial threat to public safety and such 
action is the only reasonable alternative. In such case, the danger must be clearly 
imminent and recognizable. 
If the pursued vehicle is a motorcycle, officers shall not attempt to dislodge the rider 
unless deadly force is justified. 
E. Roadblocks 
Barricading a roadway must be considered a force likely to result in death or serious injury. 
Therefore, the use of force and use of deadly force policy applies. 
F. Use of Firearms in Vehicle Pursuits 
The use of a firearm during a pursuit will be very carefully examined and must conform to the 
Department Firearms Policy. 
G. One-Way Roads 
Pursuing a vehicle the wrong way on a one-way road is extremely dangerous and may end in 
tragedy. Freeway traffic and speeds enhance that danger. As a general rule officers will not 
pursue a vehicle traveling the wrong way on a one-way road. If such an endeavor is 
undertaken a detailed explanation of the circumstances must be included in the report. The 
following options are available to the pursuing officers and should be considered. 
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1. Maintaining visual contact with the suspect vehicle from a parallel road or side of 
freeway. 
2. Monitoring the suspect from Freeway on and off ramps if possible. 
V, Procedures 
A. Pursuits Within Bountiful 
1. Upon initiating a pursuit, the initiating officer will immediately engage both 
emergency lights and siren, and as soon as practical notify the Communications 
Officer of: 
a. The location, direction of travel, and estimated speed. 
b. The description of suspect vehicle and license number. 
c. The reason for the pursuit. 
d. The description of the vehicle's occupants. 
2. The back up or assigned secondary police unit, when in position, will be responsible 
to: 
a. Call the pursuit; locations, directions, etc. This will be done constantly, so 
that Communications Officers and other police units will be informed of the 
progress of the pursuit. 
b. Watch for hazards, etc., that the primary car may not be observing, and relay 
that information. 
B. Pursuits Entering Into Other Jurisdictions 
If a pursuit initiated by officers of this department enters into another jurisdiction or enters 
the freeway, the dispatcher will immediately notify the affected law enforcement agency. 
Only the initiating police unit and assigned backup unit will cross jurisdictional boundaries to 
continue the pursuit. The supervisor or officer in charge will evaluate the pursuit and 
determine if continuing is within the guidelines of this policy. 
48 
General Order | 92-1 
BOUNTIFUL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
| Date Effective | September 1,1996 
Page 7 
In the event the pursuit terminates outside of the originating officers jurisdiction, the 
supervisor or officer in charge shall determine if there is additional personnel required and will 
request such units to be sent to the scene. Personnel other than those officers involved as the 
initial and secondary unit will not respond to a termination scene outside of the originating 
jurisdiction without permission of their supervisor. 
C. Pursuits Entering From Another Jurisdiction 
Upon receiving information about a pursuit initiated by another agency entering Bountiful the 
Communications Officer will broadcast description, location, direction of travel and any other 
significant information. If possible the reason for the pursuit should be considered before 
becoming involved in a pursuit that is progressing from another jurisdiction. 
No more than two police units from our department should actively become involved in the 
pursuit unless more help is requested by the outside agency or assigned at the request of the 
supervisor. However, police units close to the pursuit will prepare to offer necessary 
assistance at the conclusion of the pursuit. 
The Bountiful Officers assisting the unit involved in the outside agency's pursuit will 
terminate participating in such pursuit at our city boundary. If circumstances justify continued 
pursuit by a Bountifiil Police Officer the on-duty supervisor may grant approval. 
D. Pursuits Initiated by Officers While They Are In Another Jurisdiction 
Officers from this agency who initiate a pursuit while in another jurisdiction shall notify the 
agency having jurisdiction of the pursuit. The provisions of this policy will then be followed, 
unless otherwise directed by that jurisdiction. 
E. Communications Officers Duties 
1, Pursuits Occurring Within Bountiful 
The dispatcher will clear the frequency for emergency traffic and instruct the initiating 
pursuit unit, and assigned backup unit to change to the Statewide One Radio Channel. 
The Communications Officer will announce the pursuit and notify the supervisor or 
officer in charge. The Communications Officer will also run registration and want 
information on the suspect vehicle if license # is available and have that information 
immediately available upon request, but will not be broadcast. 
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2. Pursuits Enterine From Another Jurisdiction 
The Communications Officer will immediately broadcast description, location, 
direction of travel and the reason for the pursuit and any other significant data to the 
field police units. If the reason of the pursuit is not known, the Communications 
Officer will immediately attempt to ascertain the reason for the pursuit from the 
originating agency and relay that information to the police field units. 
VL Termination of Pursuits 
A. Pursuits Will be Terminated When 
1. The suspect vehicle stops. 
2. When the initial police unit or secondary unit terminates the pursuit due to the futility 
of the pursuit, or declares termination based on other information available to those 
officers. 
3. The identity of the suspect is known, and the offense is not a forcible felony. 
4. The risks of the pursuit are not warranted by tHe nature of the offense. 
5. The pursuit is terminated by order of the on duty supervisor, or the officer in charge. 
B. Post Pursuit Discipline 
1. Safety is critical at the termination of a pursuit. At no time will the need for decisive 
action, self control, and strict personal discipline be more essential. The responsibility 
for maintaining control and directing activities at the termination point remains with 
the senior officer involved in the pursuit until relieved by a supervisor. 
2. Plainclothes officers will ensure they are readily identifiable as police officers by 
affixing proper identification on their outer garments. 
VEL Required Reports | 
A. The initiating officers) and the secondary unit officer(s) shall submit an offense report of the 
pursuit. 
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B. Each officer who became involved by assisting with traffic, blocking an intersection or 
otherwise involved during the pursuit, or was present at the point of termination is required 
to submit a report. 
C. In addition to the required arrest and incident reports, the initiating officer will be required 
to fill out a Vehicular Pursuit Report and submit it along with the arrest and incident reports. 
See attached sample of pursuit report form. 
D. A copy of all reports submitted will be forwarded to the Patrol Division Commander and 
Chief of Police for their review. 
VDOL Pursuit Review 
A critique of each pursuit will be conducted by the Patrol Division Commander and supervisor of the 
officers participating in the pursuit. The critique will include review of the pursuit, receive feedback 
from the officers regarding suggestions for policy improvement and if policy and procedures were 
followed. 
By order of: 
PaulRapp -Chief of Police 
I have read the above order and fully understand it: 
Employee's Signature Date 
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